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Abstract: We present a new understanding of Christ’s real presence inthe Eucharist on the model of Stump’s account of God’s omnipresenceand Green and Quan’s account of experiencing God in Scripture. On thisunderstanding, Christ is derivatively, rather than fundamentally,located in the consecrated bread and wine, such that Christ is present
to the believer through the consecrated bread and wine, therebymaking available to the believer a second-person experience of Christ,where the consecrated bread and wine are the way in which she sharesattention with him. The consecrated bread and wine are then, in asense, icons of Christ.
He wondered where she had hidden herself, . . . [t]he woman who kneltdown on the floor in front of him, and took him by the shoulders on themorning of his First Holy Communion, and said, ‘Remember who youare. When you take the host, say it in your heart: Hello Jesus, my nameis Emmet Madigan.’ Anne Enright, The Green Road‘And remember, I am with you always, to the end of the age’ (Matthew 28.20; allbiblical references are to the NRSV). So ends the Gospel according to Matthew, withChrist’s last words to his disciples. Now, many present Christians, latter day disciples,as it were, take these last words of Christ to apply not only to the disciples of the early
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first century but also to them. But, given that we, and indeed the disciples of the earlyfirst century, following Christ’s ascension, do not see Christ as the disciples saw himin his earthly life, as a physical person whom we can see, hear, and touch, how is itpossible for Christ to be with them and us always? No question could be more urgentfor those who, like the disciples of the early first century, wish to live in relationshipwith him, though they have never seen, heard, or touched him as a physical person.One way to give a philosophical explanation of Christ’s presence with us now,even though we do no not see him as the disciples then saw him, is to point to Christ’s‘real presence’ in the Eucharist, and then try to explain just what ‘real presence’amounts to. The Eucharist is a sacrament of the Church that signifies not only gracein those who participate in it but also the ‘real presence’ of Christ in the sacramentitself. In this sacrament, the Church re-enacts Christ’s last supper with his disciples:in the liturgy of the sacrament, a priest takes bread and repeats Christ’s words, ‘Thisis my body which is given for you. Do this in remembrance of me’, and then takes acup of wine and, again, repeats Christ’s words, ‘This is the cup of the new covenant inmy blood. Do this, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of me’, and, after invokingthe Holy Spirit, Christ is now ‘really present’ in the Eucharist in virtue of standing insome sort of relation to the consecrated bread and wine.Just what this relation is has puzzled philosophical theologians for centuries,with answers tending to fall into two groupings: either identity, where theconsecrated bread and wine is, in some way, Christ himself, or symbolic, where theconsecrated bread and wine, in some way, symbolize Christ. In this paper, we presenta new way of understanding this relation, namely, iconic, where the consecratedbread and wine serve as icons of Christ.1 On this understanding, the consecratedbread and wine are ways of, and occasions for, a second-person experience of Christ,whereby the communicant shares attention with Christ. We motivate this account byconsidering some recent advances in the debate on God’s omnipresence, itself apuzzling doctrine, using the lessons learned to chart the way forward in the debateon Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist.
1. God’s omnipresence and Christ’s ‘real presence’ in the
EucharistWith respect to every place, God is present there, or so says the doctrine ofomnipresence. And if presence implies location, as it seems to do, then, with respect
1 Although this is a new position, there are similarities with our account and a Lutheranunderstanding of Christ’s true presence in the Eucharist. According to Luther, Christ is present in theelements since, by his divine nature, he is present at all places. However, he is present in a particularway in Eucharist, since he is present to the individual. This Lutheran model is also adopted by SørenKierkegaard (2011). Although we too emphasise Christ’s presence to the participant, we circumventthe issues which Luther raises concerning Christ’s ubiquity, since commitment to this doctrine isn’tnecessary for the position we develop.
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to every place, God is located there. Now, according to Ross Inman, there are two waysfor an object x to be located at a place p:
Fundamental Location: x is located at p fundamentally =df x is located at
p in its own right, i.e. not in virtue of standing in a relation(s), to somedistinct y that is located at p in its own right.
Derivative Location: x is located at p derivatively =df x is located at p invirtue of standing in some relation(s), to some distinct entity, y, where
y is located at p fundamentally. (Inman forthcoming, 3)Both approaches have their recent champions. Hud Hudson (2009, 2014), Inman(forthcoming), Robert Oakes, (2006) and Alexander Pruss (2013) defendfundamental location accounts of God’s omnipresence, while William Lane Craig andJ.P. Moreland (2003), Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkranz (2002), EleonoreStump (2010, 2013), Richard Swinburne (1993), Charles Taliaferro (1994), andEdward Wierenga (2010) defend derivative location accounts of God’s omnipresence.We can understand the debate about the real presence of Christ in theEucharist in similar terms. One way for Christ to be really present in the Eucharist isfor him to be present in the consecrated bread and wine, and so be located in theconsecrated bread and wine, and so be located at the place occupied by theconsecrated bread and wine. This would then be a fundamental location account ofthe real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. The most prominent such account is thedoctrine of transubstantiation, according to which, at the consecration, the substanceof the bread and of the wine are transformed into the substance of the Body and Bloodof Christ, respectively. Alternatively, Christ could be really present in the Eucharist invirtue of some relation he has with the fundamentally located consecrated bread andwine. In contrast to the doctrine of transubstantiation, such derivative locationaccounts of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist have received scant attention inthe recent philosophical literature on the Eucharist. We aim to redress the balanceand propose a receptionist account of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist on whichChrist is really present to a believer who receives the consecrated bread and wine;the Eucharist is then a mode of, and an occasion for, a second-person experience ofChrist.2
2. Fundamental location accounts of the real presence of
Christ in the Eucharist
2 A brief word about terminology would be helpful here. We’re using ‘mode’ as roughly synonymouswith ‘way’. So, a mode of experiencing a person is a particular way of experiencing them, say, inperson, over Skype, by email and so on. An occasion for experiencing a person is a particular timewhen you experienced that person, say, going to the theatre together last Thursday evening.
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If a fundamental location account is correct, then Christ is located at the placeoccupied by the consecrated bread and wine. But how could Christ be so located,given that the consecrated bread and wine have all of the apparent properties ofbread and wine and none of the apparent properties of Christ? Furthermore, howcould Christ be multiply located given that Christ is fundamentally located at both ofthe places occupied by the spatially separated, consecrated bread and wine?Recently, Alexander Pruss (2013) and Martin Pickup (2014) have addressedthese objections, Pruss the former, Pickup the latter, in terms of Christ being wholly
present in the consecrated bread and wine, and have argued that these objections canbe rebutted successfully. If they are right in each case, then an account of the Eucharistin terms of fundamental location is possible. We argue that their suggestions faceserious objections, and that therefore, an alternative is well motivated.Pruss defines ‘being wholly present’ as follows:(WP): x is wholly present in L at internal time t if and only if x exists at
t and every intrinsic feature that x has at t is present in L at t.and states the problem it gives rise to for the metaphysics of the Eucharist as follows:The Catholic view is that Christ’s body and blood is wholly present inthe location of the Eucharistic species. But by [(WP)] this implies thatevery intrinsic feature of Christ’s body and blood is present there aswell. However, Christ has a certain height and a certain mass. Thus, itseems, a certain height is present in the host and certain mass. Now, theheight of Christ is several feet and his mass is over a hundred pounds.But how could several feet of height be found in such a small place? Andwe certainly do not observe such a great mass in the host. (Pruss 2013,70)Pruss’s suggestion, for which he refers us to his previous work (Pruss 2009),is that features like height and weight are not, in fact, intrinsic properties. He givestwo reasons for thinking so. The first, he tells us, is that ‘[we] learn from Einstein thatshape and size depend on a reference frame’ (Pruss 2009, 530). Now we do indeedlearn from Einstein that shape and size depend on a reference frame, but theconclusion to draw from that is far from obvious. In fact, it is a matter of considerabledebate in the philosophy of physics whether it follows that there is, in fact, no fact ofthe matter concerning size and shape. The debate need not concern us here, however,for as a matter of fact Pruss is simply mistaken. Einstein teaches us that at very highspeeds a rectangle will appear square; but no matter how fast the rectangle moves, itwill never appear to be a loaf of bread. The same is true of Christ’s body: Einstein gaveus no reason to think that Christ’s human body could have the extrinsic shape of acommunion wafer.
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The second reason Pruss gives is that ‘[we] might also say that the shape andsize of an object supervenes on the positions of its parts’ (Pruss 2009, 530). Prussdoesn’t elaborate, so it isn’t clear what to make of this claim. Intrinsic properties, asDavid Lewis defines them, are properties ‘which things have in virtue of the way theythemselves are’ (1986, 61). To deny that something’s shape is an intrinsic propertybecause shape ‘supervenes on the position of its parts’ isn’t so much a qualification ofthe distinction, but a denial of it. Pruss is right that things have the shape they do invirtue of the positions of their parts, but that does nothing to show that shape is,therefore, not intrinsic. Theodore Sider’s words are apposite:…’intrinsic’ is partially a term of art. Everyday use and the notion’sintended theoretical application provide some non-negotiableconstraints on how any notion deserving the name must behave. Onany construal of intrinsicality, shape properties like being a perfect
sphere should turn out intrinsic; on any construal properties like being
within 10 feet of a perfect sphere should not turn out intrinsic. (1996,10)If our argument is successful, and Pruss’s original problem still stands, the obviousmoral to draw from the discussion is to deny that which is forcing the problem,namely (WP): demanding that all of Christ’s intrinsic features be present in theEucharistic species is a mistake. Now at the beginning of his paper, Pruss writes, ‘[the]basic relation that I will work with is being present in a location’ – and indeed, that isthe problem. Pruss is insisting on fundamental location, whereas, in fact, derivativelocation is in order. However, even if our argument is unsuccessful, Pruss has onlyshown that an account of the Eucharist in terms of fundamental location can escape
one of the major objections to it.Pickup (2014) attempts another solution. He provides an account of how, fortwo different spatially-located entities A (the bread) and B (the wine), it can be thecase that:RP1: A and B are each the whole body and blood of Christ.According to Pickup’s account, RP1 can be understood by analogy with a case of timetravel if we grant the logical possibility of someone hopping into a time machine andreappearing at an earlier time alongside an earlier incarnation of themselves.Presumably they can do this any number of times, and so it is possible for one and thesame person, henceforth call her ‘Jane’, to be instantiated at some particular(external) time n times over, for any n. RP1 can be understood analogously to such acase, where A and B correspond to two different instances of Jane. If the time travelcase is possible, argues Pickup, then so is RP1.Apart from depending on the possibility of time travel, which is controversial,we have some additional concerns with this picture. To understand these, we must
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first distinguish between two different possible interpretations of time travel,between which Pickup hopes to remain neutral, namely, endurantism andperdurantism. The difference between endurantism and perdurantism, for the sakeof this paper, will simply be that the latter accepts the existence of temporal parts,while the former rejects them. Examples involving time travel will have to be treatedvery differently by endurantists and perdurantists. We first consider the endurantistversion.If endurantism is true, there are no temporal parts. The different instances ofJane in the time travel case, then, are not temporal parts of Jane. When not beingcareful with our words, we may describe the room as being filled with n number ofJanes. However, this isn’t quite right on the endurantist’s view, because ‘Jane’ refersto the single enduring woman. There aren’t different Janes, but one. This threatens tobecome very awkward for Pickup’s account of the Eucharist, for we might similarlywonder what ‘A’ and ‘B’ refer to, if not to temporal parts of the enduring body andblood of Christ. An endurantist might propose that A and B are events in the life of thebody and blood of Christ (this seems to be Brian Leftow’s (2004, 308) view of the Janecase). But that can’t be right. Events cannot be broken, eaten or drunk, but the breadand wine can (this point is made by Hasker (2009, 163) against Leftow’s view). Moreto the point, events cannot be bodies or blood, at least, not in anything like theordinary sense of those terms. An endurantist might alternatively say that A and B arespatial, but not temporal parts of the body and blood of Christ. However, this won’tvindicate RP1, as A and B would not then each be wholly the body and blood of Christ.The only endurantist alternative that I can think of is to hold that ‘A’ and ‘B’ do simplyrefer to the body and blood of Christ itself, and not parts or events of that body andblood. This would entail that A=B, that is, that the consecrated bread is numericallyidentical with the consecrated wine. But is it plausible to say that the bread and thewine are identical? Christians who believe in the real presence of Christ in theEucharist often speak of ‘the two species of the Eucharist’. It seems difficult tounderstand how there are two species (namely the bread and the wine) of theEucharist on an altar unless the bread is non-identical with the wine. Perhaps A andB are the same enduring object but falling under different phase sortals (‘bread’ and‘wine’, if these are in fact sortals), but it isn’t entirely clear how an endurance theoristcan make sense of A and B falling under different phase sortals in a way which doesn’tfirst involve distinguishing between A and B, and this raises the problem all overagain. We grant that the situation is better on the perdurantism version of theanalogy. If perdurantism is true, according to Pickup, we can conceive of the body andblood of Christ as a perduring object, while conceiving of A and B as temporal partsof this object. According to the perdurantist view, A and B would not be absolutelyidentical with each other or with the body and blood of Christ. A and B would bothsatisfy (WP), Pruss’s definition of whole presence. However, opponents of multi-location might point out that the perdurantist account of the time travel case maysimply suggest that (WP) is too weak a definition of whole presence. If there was some
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external time t at which A and B both existed, at locations L1 and L2 respectively, astemporal parts of some perduring object, then where is the perduring object located?Surely at both. But if this is true, then, it might be objected, A and B must also be spatialas well as temporal parts of the perduring objects. This, it might be thought, issufficient on its own to show that the body and blood of Christ isn’t wholly located ineither A or B.We grant that this is by no means a knock-down objection, and it isn’t intendedas such. Pickup may well have the resources to respond to the worries that we thinkconfront his proposal. However, the reliance of this account on both the logicalpossibility of time travel and multi-location, both of which face well knownobjections, is inescapable and is perhaps the most serious cause for concern. Weconclude that the fundamental-location accounts of the Eucharist in thecontemporary literature face several serious worries, and we think this provides agood motivation for developing an alternative in terms of derivative location.
3. A derivative location account: receptionismHaving argued that neither Pruss nor Pickup successfully rebut objections to afundamental location account of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist, we propose aderivative location account, one on which the consecrated bread and wine canoccasion a particular kind of experience of Christ, namely, a second-personexperience of Christ, that is, the consecrated bread and wine are a mode of, and anoccasion for, a communicant to experience Christ as a person. In essence, theconsecrated bread and wine are icons by means of which communicant and Christshare attention with each other. Let us remind ourselves of what it is for an object xto be derivatively located at a place p:
Derivative Location: x is located at p derivatively =df x is located at p invirtue of standing in some relation(s), R(s), to some distinct entity, y,where y is located at p fundamentally.On the view we favour, Christ (x) is derivatively located at the place occupied by theconsecrated bread and wine (p) in virtue of standing in an ‘iconic’ relation (R) to theconsecrated bread and wine which is located at p fundamentally, where x stands inan iconic relation to y just in case y is a mode of, and an occasion for, a second-personexperience of x. More simply, the consecrated bread and wine are a mode of, and anoccasion for, a second-person experience of Christ. To unpack this view, we firstexplain the concept of a second-person experience by employing Stump’s (2010)analysis of this concept. We then discuss how spiritual practices can occasion second-person experiences of God by discussing Adam Green and Keith A. Quan’s (2012)account of experiencing God through Scripture. We conclude by applying this accountto our understanding of Christ’s derivative location in the Eucharistic elements.
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In Stump’s account of God’s omnipresence, she notes that as well as being ableto describe a person’s presence in relation to a space and a time in terms of present
in and present at, we can also add a kind of second-personal presence, namely,present to. This kind of presence is lacking when someone is present in a space andat a time but isn’t present to the other persons in the room. For instance, to useStump’s example, we might say that ‘She read the paper all through dinner and wasnever present to any of the rest of us’ (2013, 64). What is lacking here isn’t the agent’spresence in a space or at a time, but rather, it is a kind of ‘second-personalpsychological connection’ with the other persons in the room. Stump defines thisaccount of second-personal experience in more detail in Wandering in Darkness. Asshe describes it here, Paula has a second-person experience of Jerome only if1. Paula is aware of Jerome as a person.2. Paula’s personal interaction with Jerome is of a direct and immediate sort.3. Jerome is conscious. (2010, 75-76)What is it to interact personally with another person in a direct and immediate sort?And what is lacking from Paula’s failing to share attention with Jerome by reading thepaper all through dinner? Part of Stump’s answer to these questions is that in orderto have second-person experience, persons must share attention with one another.Shared-attention, put briefly, is a kind of mutual awareness between persons, this isthe kind of experience infants and caregivers have through engaging in mutual eyecontact with one another, for example.3 Stump argues that we can understandomnipresence in these terms: ‘[i]n one and the same eternal present, omnipresentGod is available to share attention with any person at any place in any time’ (2013,71). Although we are not interested here in defending Stump’s derivative accountof omnipresence, we think that it provides a helpful way of thinking about Christ’spresence at the Eucharist. On this iconic understanding of Christ’s presence, it’s notChrist’s presence in a place or at a time which is important, but rather, Christ’spresence to the individual through a kind of attention sharing. As Martin Lutherwrites in his discussion of Christ’s presence at the Eucharist, ‘it is one thing if God ispresent, and another if he is present for you’ (1961).4 This presence to an individualis the kind of presence we think that it is important to explain. How can we adoptStump’s account of attention sharing to our understanding Christ’s presence in the
3 There is a great deal of secondary literature on the philosophy and psychology of joint-attention (orshared-attention) between persons. See for instance Naomi Elian, Christoph Hoerl, TeresaMcCormack and Johannes Roessler (eds), 2005 as well as Axel Seemann (ed) 2012. Since our accountdoesn’t depend on the psychology of joint-attention to be correct, we avoid going into too muchdetail here.4 For another, similar account of Christ’s presence to the individual at the Eucharist, see Kierkegaard2011.
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Eucharist? And how can bread or wafers and a sip of wine allow us to experienceChrist in this way?To see how the Eucharist can provide us with a mode of, and an occasion for,sharing attention with Christ, consider another application of the second-personalmodel of religious experience, namely, Green and Quan’s (2012) account ofexperiencing God through Scripture.5 According to Green and Quan, one way ofunderstanding the claim that God is present in, and speaking through Scripture is tomaintain that Scripture gives us a mode of, and an occasion for, a shared attentionexperience with God. First, it will be important to give a more detailed account ofshared-attention. As Green and Quan outline it, ‘shared attention occurs when one isengaged in an act of attending to something and, in doing so, one is cooperating withanother who is engaged in a parallel act of attending. Shared attention involvescoordinated “attention-focusing”’ (2012, 419). This kind of shared attention caneither be dyadic, in which case two individuals focus attention only on one another,or triadic, in which case both attendants focus on an independent object or event.Further, it is important that shared-attention is coordinated attention rather thanmerely ‘mutual object focusing’ (Brinck 2001, 262). When a mother and child shareeye contact they enjoy dyadic shared-attention. If the child points to a bright light inthe room and the mother follows her gaze there is mutual object focusing. When thechild looks back to see that her mother has followed her gaze, there is triadic sharedattention. Cooperation is a crucial component of shared attention and thus if themother leaves the room whilst the child looks over to the bright light, the experiencewill be a very different one. According to Green and Quan ‘the cooperation of the otherin attending is a phenomenal constituent of the experience of shared attention itself’(2012, 420).With this model in place, Green and Quan discuss more specifically howwritten text may allow one to share attention. They consider the following two cases:
Case 1Becky likes to cook along with the Rachael Ray show. The show is onthe Spanish-speaking channel during her dinner hour, and Becky doesnot speak Spanish, so she follows the English subtitles. When Ray says“Consider the golden brown crust of this zucchini bake” Becky is ableto use her abilities to engage in shared attention as mediated by thesubtitles to attend to the zucchini bake pictured on the screen. She thenimagines what Rachael Ray would say about the zucchini bake thatBecky is cooking and is led to look at the crust of her own zucchini bake,pondering whether it is golden brown as it should be.
Case 2
5 For another account of second-personal experience, but applied to religious art, see David Efird andDaniel Gustafsson 2015.
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Alex wins a private cooking lesson with Rachael Ray. He is deaf, soRachael communicates with him using written notes. At a certain pointin the lesson, she hands him a note that reads, “Consider the goldenbrown crust of this zucchini bake,” at which point he attends withRachael to the crust. He looks back at Rachael who smiles and holds outa note between them that reads, “You done good.” (2012, 423)In Case 1, Becky doesn’t share attention with Rachael Ray, since Ray isn’t present forher to share attention with. However, she uses the same abilities that she uses whengenuinely sharing attention with another person. Becky’s reading of the subtitlesallows her to focus on the object of attention which Rachel Ray wishes her audienceto focus on and also to ‘navigate her own environment in light of what she reads’(2012, 423). According to Green and Quan, Case 2 is an example of genuine sharedattention; the first note which Alex reads functions much like a child’s point towardsthe light and is an example of triadic shared attention mediated by text. The secondnote is an example of dyadic shared attention in which Alex and Rachel shareattention with one another.These examples serve as the basis for the distinction which Green and Quanmake between ‘genuine’ and ‘pseudo’ shared-attention. Pseudo-shared-attentionisn’t an illusion of shared attention, but rather, a kind of ‘as if’ attention sharingwhereby the individual ‘processes an input in an “as if” mode (e.g., “as if” the personon the TV were present’ (2012, 423). Genuine shared attention through text occurswhen two individuals cooperate in attention sharing in either the dyadic or triadicvariety. They extend this taxonomy of genuine shared attention further by dividingthis experience into an ‘instrumental’ and ‘constitutive’ shared attention. They givethe following example to demonstrate this difference:if Rachael Ray hands Alex a note that says, “My producer Buddy is inthe next room and he wants to give you a new blender,” Alex may thenbe empowered by the note to have dyadic and triadic sharedexperiences with Buddy, but the note is not part of any cooperativeactivity shared by Alex and Buddy. The note is only a means of puttingAlex in a position to engage in shared attention with Buddy. (2012, 422)An instrumental shared-attention experience is different from a pseudo-shared-attention experience in that it alerts Alex to an actual agent (Buddy) who is availableto share attention with him.With these distinctions outlined, Green and Quan consider the theologicalclaim that God speaks through or is present in the text found in Scripture. Accordingto Green and Quan, if text can allow us to share attention in various degrees with otherpersons, then the same can be true of God. For instance, one might have a kind ofpseudo-shared-attention experience with God when one reads the story of thehealing of the paralysed man in the Gospel according to Mark, chapter 2; we might
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imagine ourselves in the position of the man and read the words ‘Son, your sins areforgiven’ as if they are being spoken directly to us. However, according to Green andQuan, pseudo-shared-experience cannot account fully for God’s continuing presenceand speaking through Scripture. Pseudo-shared-attention is possible with otherliterary texts, such as Plato’s account of Socrates in the Republic, for example.However, ‘[t]he Christian tradition appears to assert that Scripture is unique in thatGod is actually present and speaking in Scripture, not just that Scripture lends itselftoward imagining that God is present and speaking’ (2012, 425). Thus, Green andQuan claim that Scripture can also act as an instrumental shared-attentionexperience, alerting one to the presence of an agent (God) who is able to share-attention with you, much like the previous example of passing a note. For example,‘[w]hen the psalmist writes, “Taste and see that the Lord is good,” it represents theworld as being a place that includes a divine being whose goodness is available forthe experiencing’ (2012, 425). It is even possible, Green and Quan argue, to have aconstitutive shared-attention experience with God:Much like Rachael Ray hands Alex a note about the zucchini bake todirect his attention to the zucchini bake in Case 2, so God might,through the Scriptures, direct one’s attention to one’s pride. Just as Rayhands Alex a note saying he “done good” that shapes how Alexexperiences Ray’s kindly smile, so God might elect for the contents ofScripture to shape a dyadic experience of the divine. Shared attentionrequires that the agent one is sharing attention with be experienced aspresent, even if implicitly. Thus, the constitutive reading draws a tightlink between the role that the text plays in facilitating shared attentionand God’s being present. (2012, 426)Green and Quan note that whilst ‘as if’ experiences might be the most common, it ispossible for these experiences to act as a prime for us to experience scripture in aninstrumental and constitutive way. Pseudo, or ‘as if’, shared-attention experiencesencourage us to engage with Scripture and to enter into the ‘cooperative activity withthe divine in which God uses the text of the Scriptures to reveal Himself dyadically ortriadically’. Thus, the model of experiencing God through Scripture which Green andQuan present, allows for a kind of progressive experience of God—starting with thefacilitation of an imaginary, or ‘as if’ experience, and working towards genuineconstitutive shared attention. The advantage of this is that the model isn’t an all ornothing approach; whilst it is true that God is only really present when he is present
to the individual constitutively, the other modes of attention-sharing may facilitatethis kind of experience in the future.Now, whilst it might be clear how two persons can share-attention throughsharing eye contact, for instance, it might be more difficult to grasp how a personcould attend to the mind of God in the same way. We cannot share eye contact withGod or perceive God’s body language in the same way that Alex interacts with Rachel
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Ray. All of the above examples of sharing-attention involve persons who arefundamentally located nearby to one another. However, we have claimed that Christcannot be fundamentally located in the Eucharistic meal.Whilst many of the examples given by Green and Quan are cases in whichpersons can direct perceive one another, nearness of fundamental location is notnecessary for the model of shared-attention they employ. As Green explains thismodel elsewhere,the pattern of one's experience appears to manifest a shared awarenessbetween the divine and oneself within which affect and information canbe communicated. […] [U]sing the shared-attention account, we canclaim that sound, light, and affect are all mediums that can bemanipulated by God in such a way as to reveal the mind of God towardthe subject of the experience. The subject hears the sound of a voicereading a psalm that responds to his situation, a manipulation ofauditory stimulation that evidences an awareness and concern for thesubject by some theistically affiliated entity. He or she then experiencesan unnatural light which seems patterned to reinforce the extra-naturalnature of the reassuring voice. Then, the subject has the experience asof being loved and then one of peace, perhaps through the activation ofthe subject's mirror neurons or perhaps in another way. The precedingpattern of light and audition does not seem epistemically incidental tothe experience of being loved. The shared-attention model allows thepreceding pattern of sensory imagery to enter into how oneexperiences whatever qualia were present in the experience such thatit is experienced as being loved by God. (2002, 463-464)The shared-attention model of religious experience depends on a person’s ordinaryperception of the world, but unlike all of the above examples of shared-attentionbetween human persons, in the case of divine-human shared attention what isperceived is not the body of God. As Green describes it, a person becomes aware ofGod’s personal presence in a mystical way, but through her ordinary experiences ofthe word.If Green’s model is a feasible explanation of experiences of divine presence andif text can allow us to share-attention with another person (including a divinedisembodied person), then so too can an object or an event, we think. Green’s modelof mystical experience can be extended beyond sharing-attention through text.Objects often portray meaning in a rich and evocative way, and allow forintersubjective experience. Consider a further example of attention-sharing:
Case 3Alex and Rachael have been married for 50 years. On their first date,Alex cooked Rachael a steak with peppercorn sauce and green beans.
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Recently, they have been having difficulties in their marriage, butdecide to devote the evening to spend together. Alex comes in the roomand looks at Rachael, and presents her with a plate of steak withpeppercorn sauce and green beans. Rachael looks back at Alex, withoutsaying anything and smiles at him, whilst placing her hand over her ringfinger.Now, just as in the Rachael Ray cases, in this case, nothing is spoken and an observermight miss the significance of this interaction. However, in the presentation of certainactions and the repetition of past acts, Alex is able to share-attention with Rachael ina way which far surpasses what he could have written in a card or said in words. Themutual focus on an object allows for Alex and Rachael to share-attention bothdyadically (mutual awareness) and triadically (mutual object awareness),furthermore it is an experience which allows Alex to communicate somethingimportant to Rachael without using text or speech. Clearly, if text can allow formeaningful shared-attention between persons, then so too can objects and events.The application to the Eucharist should seem obvious by now. We have shownthat according to Green and Quan, the reading of a piece of text can allow for mysticalattention-sharing with God. We have also shown that an analogue of this experiencecan be had through the experience of a significant event. Thus, it follows that somekind of event could also allow for an experience of a divine person who is notfundamentally located nearby to the perceiver. Now let’s see how this can be appliedto our understanding of the Eucharist.For the Christian believer, the Eucharistic meal has a significance much likethe significance of Alex’s reconciliation meal with his wife. The Eucharist is areconciliation meal—it’s content is focused on Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, theforgiveness of the participant’s sins and the possibility of closer union with Christ.This will sometimes be formalised by means of liturgy which focuses the participant’sattention onto these components of the sacrament, but as with Alex and Rachael’sreconciliation meal, clearly propositional content isn’t necessary for this kind ofattention sharing. Through the Eucharistic elements, the participant is able to focusher attention on Christ in a way which is very similar, albeit in some ways different,to that of the way text can occasion attention sharing between persons. Notably,however, as with Alex and Rachael’s meal, what is communicated isn’t a set ofpropositions, but the sacrament will have a different meaning depending on theparticipant’s relation to Christ.Green and Quan’s model of attention-sharing through text gives us a helpfuldichotomy to outline the kinds of experience that the Eucharist might allow for. Aswith their discussion of experiencing God through Scripture, these experiences canfunction progressively, starting with pseudo shared-attention experiences, and theneventually allowing the individual to have a constitutive shared-attention experiencethrough participating in the Eucharist. We’ll outline these different levels ofexperience, but it’s important to note (as with Scripture) that in order to make sense
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of the claim that Christ is present in the Eucharist, only a constitutive shared-attention experience will do. So whilst pseudo and instrumental experiences mightenable an individual to eventually experience Christ constitutively, they won’t countas examples of Christ being present in the Eucharist by being present to theparticipant.First, then, it is obvious that participation in the Eucharist can occasion an ‘asif’ or pseudo shared-attention experience, whereby the participant focuses on thedeath of Christ and the forgiveness of sins when she partakes in the sacrament. Whenshe hears the words ‘Take, eat; this is my body which is broken for you: this do inremembrance of me’ (1 Corinthians 11.24), she receives the bread and wine as if it isgiven to her from Christ at the Last Supper. Secondly, the Eucharist can also bethought of instrumentally. In this regard the participant eats the bread and drinks thewine and this reminds her that Christ died for her, and what’s more, that his presenceis active today, that is, that he is a living agent with whom we can share attention with.The words of the Anglican liturgy seek to remind the individual of God’s presence; inresponse to the priest’s words: ‘The Lord is Here’, the congregation reply ‘His Spiritis With Us’ (Common Worship 2000, 176).6 These two kinds of experience seemuncontentious, but not sufficient for the account of derivative presence we havedefended.For the model we propose, it is important not only that the participant isreminded that Christ is present, but also that she actually experiences him as beingpresent. Much like Alex and Rachael share attention which is focused on areconciliation meal, Alex and Christ must share attention by focusing on theEucharistic meal, which is able to bring about reconciliation between them. Clearly,unlike with Rachael, Alex cannot share-attention with Christ by means of eye contact,since Christ isn’t visibly present. Nevertheless, Alex can still be aware of Christ’spresence to him. The advantage of a shared-attention model of religious experienceis that we don’t have to postulate any kind of mystical sensory apparatus. But rather,we can have an experience of someone as present to us through a number of differentmedia.7 Stump (2010, 77) claims that even an email exchange can allow for second-personal experience. For Alex’s participation in the Eucharist to count as anexperience of Christ as present to him, he must be aware that Christ is present andthat Christ is attending to him. As Søren Kierkegaard puts it, ‘[i]n the physical sense,one can point to the Communion table and say, “there it is”; but in the spiritual sense,it is actually there only if you hear his voice there’ (2011, 271). In partaking in thebread and wine, Alex can be aware that Christ is aware of him and he can be remindedof the act of grace which Christ performed on the cross, or of some unconfessed sin inhis heart through the powerful repetition of Christ’s last meal. He is aware that Christ
6 The role of the Trinity in the experience of Christ in the Eucharist is an issue which we don’t havespace to address in this paper. As we describe it, the Father makes the Son present to the individualby the power of the Holy Spirit. Thus, the congregation’s use of ‘His’ in the reply that ‘His Spirit isWith Us’ should be interpreted specifically as referring to Christ.7 See Adam Green 2009, 455-457 for a defence of this claim.
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too is present and focusing on this meal and the things that stand in the way of theirreconciliation. The elements occasion both a dyadic and triadic shared attention ofChrist and Christ is derivatively present in the Eucharistic elements.Whilst the Eucharist always has the potential to occasion this kind ofconstitutive shared-attention with Christ, it might not always be successful inproducing the rich kind of experience described by a genuine dyadic or triadic shared-attention. Communicants may enter into, and experience this union—the richness ofthe relationship, to varying degrees. This may be because of their maturity inunderstanding their relationship with Christ, and their own need for God. But it mayalso be due to inattention to some or all aspects of how Christ is presenting himselfto them—the communicant may just not be receptive at that time. It may be that thefactors that are inhibiting the person’s awareness and receptivity may be due to theservice being conducted in an unfamiliar tradition, or in a community to which theperson doesn’t yet belong. Thus, although a person may participate in a churchservice, this doesn’t mean that they have necessarily experienced a certain degree of,or indeed any, union with the present person of Christ. As Green and Quan (2012)have demonstrated, how much experience, or awareness, of the presence of Christthere is can vary. But wherever some real union has taken place that encompasses tosome minimal degree the essential aspects of the meal Jesus was instituting (theexperiences of the need for redemption, of God as the provider of redemption, ofparticipation in the security of covenantal relationship, and of eschatological hope)then Christ has been truly present and the Eucharist has been truly celebrated.8In the concluding sections of this paper, we address two important issueswhich face an iconic model of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. First, we respond tothe question of what makes the Eucharist distinct from other instances ofexperiencing Christ’s presence. And second, we ask whether our model can actuallyexplain the doctrine of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist, and if it can, we ask, whereprecisely is Christ supposed to be located?
4. What makes the Eucharist special?One advantage of focussing on the actual interpersonal interactions experienced isthat we are able to connect the experience and benefits of participation in theEucharistic meal with the interactions and benefits occurring in the rest of Christianspirituality, both within a sacramental framework, and beyond.9 The nature of the
8 We don’t have time to discuss a further corollary of this claim, but it is worth noting: there isnothing in what we have said that would prohibit this meal being celebrated with a bottle of Cokeand a bag of crisps. Although people in many (probably most) traditions would find this practice sounusual and unsettling as to disrupt their ability to relate the elements to the meaning they wouldusually confer on bread and wine, it is in principle possible for Christ to be truly present within sucha practice.9 The importance of this is emphasised by Charles Davis:
Experiencing the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist Joshua Cockayne, David EfirdGordon Haynes, August LudwigsDaniel Molto, Richard TamburroJack Warman
190
interaction between the individual and Christ isn’t different in kind from the natureof interaction which it is possible to have in prayer, worship, holy contemplation orany other activity that admits of the possibility of experiencing an intimate encounterwith Christ. Thus, the Eucharist isn’t different in kind from any other form ofsacramental (or otherwise) union. This invites the question: What makes theEucharist special?10 That is, if Christ’s presence in the Eucharist is understoodderivatively as a mode of, and an occasion for, second-person experience of Christ,and the Christian can enjoy shared-attention and second-person experience of Christthrough the reading of Scripture, prayer and experiencing Christian art (to name buta few examples), then there is nothing unique or distinctive about the Eucharisticsacrament.To answer this question, of what makes the Eucharist special, it will beimportant to note that although the interaction between Christ and the individualisn’t different in kind from other interactions with Christ, it is different in degree andcontent, and understanding this difference is important for understanding the role ofthe elements in the interaction that occurs.While the clear focus on Christ’s work on the cross provides a specialopportunity to be sensitive to experiencing Christ in the aspects we have alreadydiscussed, it doesn’t seem in principle, that the same content of experience of, forinstance, God-as-provider-of-redemption could not also be gained through earnestprayer where the content of the conversation the Christian is undertaking with Godin prayer is aimed at their growing to understand and appreciate this aspect of theirrelationship with Christ. However, the Eucharist is special, and unique in the sensethat it is a corporate opportunity of focus on Christ in a distinct way, and one that isat the centre of Christian being. It does stand out as an opportunity to focus on thework of Christ on the cross more than in any other regular tradition of the church. Butalthough special in this way, the content of the experience, and the possible scope ofinteraction found in the Eucharist, isn’t necessarily unique to participation in it. If wewere to imagine a person who for some pathological reason found it impossible toengage in the Eucharist in a church service, we can still imagine them to have both thepersonal and corporate aspects of experiencing Christ in the relevant ways throughparticipation in a prayer retreat with a group. Space doesn’t permit us to give
Catholic piety has projected upon the sacramental presence the role in the Christianlife that properly belongs to the presence of Christ by grace […] the inward andpermanent presence by grace, to which the Eucharist itself is directed, has beenforgotten. […] The Eucharist is the expression and cause of our personal union withChrist, which is a permanent and mutual personal presence. It is a personalencounter with Christ in which he once again offers us union with himself, andinvites us closer, and in which we accept and draw nearer to him. (1968, 159)
10 Or, as Martin Luther puts this problem, ‘If Christ’s body is everywhere, ah, then I shall eat and drinkhim in all the taverns, from all kinds of bowls, glasses, and tankards! Then, there is no differencebetween my table and the Lord’s table’ (1961, 67).
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examples for each and every aspect of the Eucharist we have discussed, but there isno reason in principle to think that matters will be different for other aspects, thoughexperiencing Christ in some way may well be more straightforward in the Eucharistthan elsewhere.11 So Christ commands the disciples to continue with the practice heinstitutes because it is good for them, and beneficial.12 But not because it is necessary,and without it there would be some aspect of union with Christ that they would beunable to enter into.By participating in the Eucharist we experience the real presence of Christ, andthis interaction is the metaphysical core of what makes it the transformative andspiritually nourishing activity that it is. But if this interaction is in principle possiblewithout the elements, how do the elements have a special role to play when it comesto the presence of Christ being available to us? If their role is more than mnemonic,but doesn’t extend as far as being substantially the body and blood of Christ, as wehave already discussed, then what else is there. Well, like much human activityinvolving interaction there is an element of communication—of expression—to theEucharist. Forms of liturgy, and more informal verbal articulations in the Eucharist,vary widely. But the core central element to the tradition are the receiving of breadand wine along with an acknowledgement of their representative function as thebody of Christ and the blood of the new covenant respectively. The elements have apowerful symbolic function that goes beyond corporate storytelling or provokingreflection. In receiving the elements we accept Christ’s offer of himself through atangible physical expression. This goes beyond our acknowledging that we have inthe past accepted Christ as saviour, and is a present act of reception that wecommunicate to God, in the presence of, and with, our spiritual community, through
11 Note that if we had argued that the Eucharist was the actual offering of a new sacrifice, then thiswould be an aspect that it would be difficult to imagine replicable in prayer.12 Especially given that this meal provokes the participant to experience Christ in a complete set ofaspects, which make up an important focal point in our regular Christian life and experience. Luthermakes a similar response to this question, noting thatalthough he [Christ] is everywhere, he does not permit himself to be so caught andgrasped; he can easily shell himself, so that you get the shell but not the kernel. Why?Because it is one thing if God is present, and another if he is present for you…sinceChrist’s humanity is at the right hand of God, and also is in all and above all thingsaccording to the nature of the divine right hand, you will not eat or drink him like thecabbage and soup on your table, unless he wills it. He also now exceeds any grasp, andyou will not catch him by groping about even though he is in your bread, unless hebinds himself to you and summons you to a particular table by his Words, and hehimself gives meaning to the bread for you, by his Word, bidding you to eat him. Thishe does in the Supper, saying ‘This is my body’, as if to say ‘At home you may eat breadalso, where I am indeed sufficiently near at hand too; but this is the true toutou, the‘This is my body’: when you eat this, you eat my body, and nowhere else. Why?Because I wish to attach myself here with my Word, in order that you may not haveto buzz about, trying to seek me in all the places where I am; this would be too muchfor you, and you would also be too puny to apprehend me in these places without thehelp of my Word. (1961, 69)
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receiving the bread and wine. Receiving Christ, and entering into closer union withhis presence is an action, is something we do—an action. It is an action involving ourrelational dispositions, intentions and affections. Like all interpersonal actions, theyinvolve both parties, and become real through their manifestation. Withoutparticipation of both persons, they remain a subjective imagining within. Love,companionship, comforting, encouragement, and so on are relational because theyfind a cooperative manifestation that not only communicates the content of therelational interaction, but also is that interaction. So also in experiencing the offer andreception of Christ, the receiving of the elements not only communicates ourreception of Christ and his work, but because of the representative meaning vested inthe elements by Jesus at the Last Supper, it is the act we perform by means of whichwe instantiate that reception in a relational action.
5. Locating the real presence of Christ in the EucharistRecognising this will assist us in thinking about where we place the presence of Christ.It isn’t strictly true to say that the presence of Christ is located in the elements—atleast this isn’t true at face value as matters are not that straightforward. The presenceof Christ is located in the interaction between Christ and the communicant—the realpresence of Christ is manifested and experienced in this interpersonal union.However, for the communicant, this relational interaction is manifested by taking theelements. So, it isn’t a mere gloss to claim that Christ is present in the elements, aslong as this isn’t taken to be the claim that Christ is present substantially because thebread and wine are the substances Christ’s body and blood. This is just not the aspectof Christ’s real presence that we are interested in.13 The substantial presence of Christwas no guarantee of any interpersonal union, or meaningful interaction, for those inthe first century, and neither is it for us today.The presence of Christ we are interested in involves relationship. The aspectof the elements’ function that is the vehicle for this relational interaction is the aspectunder which it is then true to say that Christ is present in the elements. Christ isn’tpresent substantially, but derivatively, because he is really present to us in relationalunion through our partaking of the elements. Notice that strictly Christ is present (tous) in our taking of the elements. If the elements were to lay unused after the service,or indeed to be eaten by a church mouse, they would fail to be aptly described as thebody and blood of Christ, since they would no longer be involved in any interpersonalinteraction. We should also note that the ‘real presence of Christ’ is shorthand for amore complex manifestation of Christ’s real presence that falls under his presentinghimself in the ways pertinent to these symbols—his offering his body and blood, and
13 Note that the metaphysical puzzles of multi-location, and of essences and accidents, associatedwith transubstantiation, just don’t arise in this view—in this sense, it is as metaphysicallyundemanding as the memorialist view. At all times the elements remain substantially bread andwine.
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all that that means to us as we interact with this (which we have discussed at lengthabove). So to be more precise, though also more laborious, Christ is ‘bodily’ presentin terms of being present in a way that allows us to interact with the offering of hisreal body and all that this means to us, and his ‘blood’ is present in terms of thesignificance and reality of the union and covenant bound in his blood being actuallyexperienced by us through our taking ourselves to be representatively partaking ofhis real blood.As Charles Davis (1968) suggests, in a transignificationist view of theEucharist, it is correct to say that the elements are the body and blood of Christbecause what something is, considered in terms of what role it plays for us as weinteract with it, is a matter of how we treat that thing. Thus, the referring terms weuse to denote objects are correctly applied by analysing whether those objectsfunction in a way that meets the criteria of those terms considered as a humancategory of thought by which we delineate the type of things objects are. However,there are many ways in which it may be true to say that the elements ‘are’ the bodyand blood of Christ in this sense—because of the way in which we treat them, withoutit being true that they are the vehicle, or manifestation, of the sort of interpersonalinteraction we have delineated. The concern here is that it may be subjectively truethat we treat the elements in a certain way, that makes the use of some terminologyappropriate under our own usage, but that there should be some further objectivebasis for the truth of the state of affairs obtaining – Christ is really present, thatdoesn’t depend on our usage of terminology or on human categories of thought. Thetransignification view doesn’t go far enough in telling us what sort of treatment of theobjects is at work in making it true that they are, to us, the body and blood of Christ.14Once we do go further and spell out how we are treating the elements, and the rolethat they are playing in the experience of, and interaction with the person of Christ,we end up with the view we have outlined above. But by now, we do not need to claimthat it is true that the elements are the body and blood of Christ in Davis’transignificationist sense. We arrive at an objective basis for the question of whetherChrist is really present that depends solely on whether the state of affairs – Christ’sbeing present (in the discussed sense), actually obtains.It will be informative to quickly consider how this view compares to two testquestions proposed by Michael Dummett (1987) as a test of the acceptability of atheory of presence in the Eucharist.15 Dummett suggests that the answer to thequestion of whether the elements are the body and blood of Christ should be anunqualified ‘yes’. Furthermore, the ability to provide this answer should depend on agenuine belief in the incarnation. By unqualified Dummett seems to have in mindruling out the sorts of qualifications that could be offered by memorialists, wherebywe say yes in virtue of Christ being present anyway, and our being provoked to relateto Christ through the symbolic meaning of the elements alone (since Dummett goes
14 Other objections have also been raised, and the view also rests on a questionable view of howterms of reference relate to the nature of objects.15 This isn’t necessarily to endorse Dummett’s criteria as necessary, or even sufficient.
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on to offer some qualification in exposition of his own view). As the discussion in thelast two paragraphs should have made clear, it is correct for us to say that theelements are the body and blood, and that the real presence of Christ is manifest inthe Eucharist. But notice that it is also true that without genuine belief in theincarnation it is impossible to truly claim that the Eucharist contains the real presenceof Christ. Without belief in the incarnation, it would be impossible to relate to Christand his work through interaction with his presenting himself to us under the bodyand blood. If Christ has not become incarnate, then the proffered relationship is justnot one that exists except in the imagination. So, without the interaction taking place,it is true to say that there is no real presence, and only the presence of bread and wine.So Dummett’s criteria are satisfied, this view affirms that the real presence of Christis in the Eucharistic meal (as an event) due to the interpersonal interaction that takesplace through participation in it.
ConclusionHaving discussed the different ways in which we can understand the claim that Christis present in the Eucharist, we have seen that an account of Christ’s fundamentallocation in the elements faces difficulties. In contrast to a fundamental understandingof Christ’s presence, we have argued for a derivative account of Christ’s being present
to the individual in which the elements serve as mode of, and an occasion, for asecond-personal, shared-attention experience with Christ. This receptionist viewdescribes the Eucharist as a sacrament in which the participants engage with andinteract with Christ as a living person. And thus, as well as avoiding the metaphysicaldifficulties associated with fundamental accounts, a receptionist account of theEucharist has a much greater potential for explaining the transformative power of thesacrament in the spiritual life of the participants. As we have seen, this position canstill make sense of the claim that Christ is present in the Eucharist, and we are alsoable to explain the uniqueness of this sacrament, compared with other experiences ofChrist’s presence. Thus, the position we have developed here is both philosophicallyrobust as well as being able to account for the centrality and importance of thispractice in lives of Christian believers.
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